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Does the UK Have Influence in the EU Legislative Process? 
 
Simon Hix 
 
 
Abstract 
The UK has influenced some major EU policies, such as the creation of the single 
market and enlargement.  But how influential are the UK government and British MEPs 
in the day-to-day EU legislative process?  To answer this question this article analyses 
recent data from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.  The 
evidence is mixed.  In the Council, in recent years the UK government has been 
outvoted more often than any other EU government, yet UK officials remain well-
connected ‘behind the scenes’.  In the European Parliament, British MEPs are now more 
likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state, yet British 
MEPs still win key committee chairs and rapporteurships.  The evidence suggests that 
if the UK votes to remain in the EU, Britain’s political elites will need to re-engage with 
Brussels politics if the UK is to avoid becoming further marginalised from mainstream 
EU politics.  
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One key issue in the debate about whether the UK should remain in the European 
Union (EU) is how much influence the UK has, or will continue to have, in the EU.  
The UK has certainly played a leadership role in several of the EU’s major projects 
over the last few decades, most notably the creation of the ‘single market’ in the 
1980s and 1990s, and the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s and 2000s.  On the other hand, the UK has voluntarily opted out of the 
Euro, the Schengen free movement zone, some aspects of justice and home affairs 
and police cooperation, and most recently the Fiscal Compact Treaty (2012) and 
the banking union.   
 These ‘big picture’ influences are perhaps easier to identify than what 
happens in the day-to-day legislative process in Brussels.  The EU adopts 
approximately 100 legislative acts per year, in the form of Directives and 
Regulations.  These cover inter alia the rules on the production, distribution and 
exchange of goods, services, capital and labour in the single market – such as 
financial services regulations, social and environmental standards, consumer 
protection standards, data protection rules, and so on – as well as EU asylum 
policies, international trade and aid policies, and how the EU budget is spent each 
year.  In most of these areas, the EU now adopts laws by the co-decision (formally 
rebranded the Ordinary Legislative Procedure under Art.189 TFEU) procedure: 
where the Commission makes draft proposals, which are then amended and 
adopted by a qualified-majority vote (QMV) in the Council, and a simple majority in 
the European Parliament.   
 This then raises a series of questions about how influential the UK is in the 
EU legislative process.  For example, does the UK tend to be on the winning side in 
votes in the EU Council?  Do British MEPs tend to support or oppose legislation in 
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the European Parliament?  And, how influential are the UK government and British 
MEPs in bargaining ‘behind the scenes’?  This article tries to answer these 
questions by analysing some of the recent data from decision-making in the 
Council and European Parliament.   
 
 
1. Voting in the Council1 
 
The obvious starting point for assessing whether a member state has influence in 
the Council is to look at the voting records in this institution.  Council voting data is 
available from www.VoteWatch.eu, which is a not-for-profit website in Brussels.2 
Formally, the ministers of the 28 EU member state governments, who meet in the 
Council according to their policy portfolios, vote on all legislative decisions and 
most votes are taken by a QMV.  In practice, though, the governments try to 
compromise, so that an agreement can be reached that all countries can support.3  
Since the enlargement of the EU to 28 member states, and with the extension of 
QMV to almost all policy areas, reaching agreement on everything has become 
difficult.  As a result, an increasing number of votes are taken with at least one 
government registering their opposition to the  final decision.   
 This “opposition” comes in two forms: a government either formally 
records a No vote, or chooses simply to Abstain.  Counting No votes and 
Abstentions together, Figure 1 shows the per cent of times each government was 
in a losing minority as a proportion of all votes in 2004-09 (1 July 2004 to 30 June 
2009) and 2009-15 (1 July 2009 to 1 September 2015). 
 
 
4 
Figure 1. Per cent of times a member state was on the losing side in the EU 
Council  
 
 
 Two things are striking: 1) there was a notable increase in the level of 
conflict in the Council between 2004-09 and 2009-15; and 2) the UK government 
was on the losing side a much higher proportion of times in 2009-15 compared to 
2004-09 (2.6 per cent in the former period and 12.3 per cent in latter period).  The 
next most frequently “losing” governments, Germany and Austria, were only on the 
minority side 5.4 per cent of the time in 2009-15.  One thing to note, though, is the 
high level of agreement in both periods.  Put the other way round, the UK voted on 
the winning side 97.4 per cent of the time in 2004-09 and 86.7 per cent of the time 
in 2009-15. 
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 Digging a bit further into the 2009-15 data, we can see which other 
governments tend to vote with the UK.  The UK’s main allies were some of our 
northern neighbours – Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark – while the German 
government was least likely to vote the same way as the UK.  In fact, the UK and 
German governments voted on opposite sides 16 per cent of the time.  In other 
words, the two governments who were most likely to vote against the majority, the 
UK and Germany, were invariably in opposition on different votes.   
 These aggregate patterns might be distorted by the fact that there were 
more votes on some policy issues than on others, with the UK opposed only in 
areas that happened to have many votes.  Breaking the data down by policy area 
reveals that the UK voted against the majority more frequently on budgetary 
policies, foreign and security policy, and international development, and voted 
with the majority more frequently on international trade, industry, environment, 
transport, legal affairs, economic and monetary union, and internal market 
policies.  In most policy areas, though, the UK was the member state most likely to 
vote against the majority, and significantly more likely than the average 
government in the EU.  However, the UK was not the most oppositional 
government on internal market, legal affairs, transport, environment, and fisheries. 
 In short, the official voting records of the EU Council suggest that there was 
a significant shift in the position of the UK government between 2004-09 and 
2009-15.   In the latter period the UK was in the minority more often than any 
other EU government.  There is some variance across policy areas, the UK has 
some powerful allies, and Germany also often votes against the winning majority.  
Nevertheless, on average, these data suggest that the UK government is less 
influential in the Council now than it has been in the past. 
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 Nevertheless, there are some important caveats to be aware of when 
considering evidence from voting records in the Council.  First, overwhelmingly 
the Council decides by consensus, which means that the UK is on the winning 
majority side almost 87 per cent of the time.  Second, the UK government might be 
more willing than other governments to publically register its opposition to EU 
decisions.  Third, these data do not tell us what went on behind the scenes on each 
of these issues in the bargaining and preparation of policy positions in the Council 
working groups.  Finally, for a fuller picture this evidence needs to be put together 
with other evidence from the policy process, such as whether the UK is influential 
in the other main legislative body: the European Parliament.   
 
 
2. Connections between Council officials 
 
Approximately two-thirds of all decisions taken by the Council under QMV are 
actually adopted with no government in opposition.  This does not mean that 
conflict has been absent on these issues, but rather that much has gone on in the 
bargaining behind-the-scenes before a formal vote occurred.  As a result, to assess 
the influence of a member state in the Council it is important to look behind the 
votes.  One way of doing this is to analyse connections between Council officials.   
 The best data for such an analysis come from 869 interviews by Daniel 
Daurin and his research team between 2006 and 2012.4  The  researchers asked a 
simple question to each member state’s official in the same 11 committees and 
working groups in the EU Council: “Which member states do you most often co-
operate with in order to develop a common position?.” The answers reveal which 
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governments tend to work together in EU negotiations, and as a result which 
governments are better connected than others.  Also, as the research was 
conducted in 2006, 2009 and 2012, it is possible to look at whether there have 
been any major changes since the Eurozone crisis and the growing Brexit debate. 
 Figure 2 shows the two sides of the connections: 1) how many other 
governments each government said that they worked with (were connected to) on 
average in each year; and 2) how many other governments mentioned a particular 
government (were connected from).  Put together, these two measures give an 
indication of how much influence an EU member state’s officials have in EU 
negotiations. 
 
Figure 2. Connections in EU Council negotiations 
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 UK officials on average mentioned 4 other governments they co-operated 
with: France, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden in 2006; Germany, France, Ireland 
and Sweden in 2009; and Germany, Netherlands and Sweden in 2012.  As the panel 
on the left shows, the officials of most other member states mentioned a higher 
number of other governments with which they co-operate.  This might reflect the 
fact that the UK officials feel confident that they can achieve their aims without 
needing the support of many others.  For example, the officials from the other large 
member states (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), with the exception of Poland, 
also mentioned only a small number of other governments, whereas the officials of 
many of the smaller member states named a higher number. 
 The centrality of the UK, along with the other large member states, is clearly 
revealed in the number of officials from other EU governments who mentioned the 
UK (in the figure on the right).  Measured this way round, the UK’s officials are the 
most well connected of all the EU’s 28 member state governments.  In fact, the 
officials of only 6 other governments (out of 26 others) did not mention the UK as 
the main government they co-operated with in their working group in either 2006, 
2009 or 2012: namely, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Cyprus, and Romania.  
Not surprisingly, France and Germany, as the other two most powerful member 
states, were identified as the second and third most mentioned by officials from 
other governments.  Interestingly, though, amongst some of the smaller member 
states, several of the UK’s traditional allies (Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark) are also central players in EU negotiations. 
 Looking at the data from 2006, 2009 and 2012 separately reveals that the 
UK’s position has been stable across time, both in terms of connections from other 
governments to the UK as well as UK connections to other governments.  If anything, 
 
9 
the number of governments connecting to UK officials increased between 2006 
and 2012.  The main change between 2006 and 2012 was the increase in the 
number of connections made by officials from some of the newer member states 
(such as Slovenia, Romania, Malta and Poland) to governments from the other 
member states.   
 
Figure 3. EU Council negotiation networks 
 
 
 Finally, whereas these numbers reveal how many connections each 
government has, they do not show which groups of governments work together.  
To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows the ‘network’ of connections in 2012.  Here, the 
arrows show the direction of a connection from one government to another, and 
the positions of the governments are determined by how many connections each 
government has as well as who they are connection to: with the more connected 
governments closer to the centre, and governments with similar connection 
patterns located closer together.  This figure clearly shows the centrality of the UK 
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in EU negotiations.  Germany and France are also close to the centre, but UK 
officials appear to be the best connected of all the member states’ officials.  And, 
again, the data from 2006 and 2009 show the same picture. 
 In other words, when it comes to negotiations behind the scenes, before 
votes take place and before laws are adopted, the data suggest that the UK 
government is right at the heart of EU policy-making, and certainly at the top table, 
alongside Germany and France.  The data also suggest that the Eurozone crisis has 
not had any noticeable effect on the centrality of the UK in EU bargaining. 
 
 
3. Voting in the European Parliament 
 
The Council is only half of the EU’s bicameral legislature, of course.  The other half 
is the European Parliament, which now has the power to amend and block EU laws 
in almost all policy areas.  So, how influential are UK Members of the European 
Parliament? 
 A good starting point is the MEPs’ voting records. There are many to 
analyse with 6,149 such votes in the 2004-09 session (EP6), 6,961 in 2009-14 
(EP7), and 2,306 between June 2014 and December 2015 in the current session 
(EP8).5  From these records we can determine whether UK MEPs and parties tend 
to be on the winning or losing side in votes, and whether our MEPs and parties 
vote with or against the European political groups to which they belong.    
 
Figure 4. Per cent of times a member state’s MEPs are on the winning side in 
the European Parliament 
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Note: A member state’s delegation of MEPs was calculated as being on the ‘winning 
side’ in a vote if the plurality of the MEPs from the member state voted the same 
way as the majority of all MEPs in the vote. 
 
 To start with, Figure 4 shows the percentage of times each member state’s 
MEPs were on the ‘winning side’ in all votes in EP6, EP7 and EP8.  The first thing to 
note is that the average is high: about 85 per cent.  This is because many votes are 
highly consensual.  Nevertheless, there is significant variation between the 
member states: from 93 per cent for Finnish MEPs (and even higher for Bulgarian 
and Romanian MEPs, who joined in 2007), to only 71% for British MEPs.  Also, 
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while British MEPs were reasonably successful in EP6, since 2009 they have been 
less likely to be on the winning side than the MEPs from any other member state. 
 But, voting in the European Parliament is mainly along political group lines 
not national lines, with higher group voting cohesion than the Democrats and the 
Republicans in the US Congress.6  Hence, what determines whether an MEP is on 
the winning or losing side is which political group she belongs to and whether she 
follows her group’s voting positions.  Also, because coalitions in the European 
Parliament tend to form along left-right lines, the centrist group in the European 
Parliament – the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) – is often 
pivotal in deciding whether a winning majority is either on the left or on the right.  
As a result, ALDE was on the winning side in votes almost 90 per cent of the time in 
EP6, EP7 and so far in EP8.  The two largest groups either side of ALDE – the 
European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – also play 
a dominant role (and are on the winning side almost as frequently as ALDE), while 
the political groups further to left – the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(EUL/NGL) and the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) – and further to the 
right – the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy (EFDD), and Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) – are 
significantly less likely to win votes. 
 The high level of political group cohesion and the dominance of the three 
centrist groups have implications for British MEPs.  Of the British MEPs, only the 
Labour Party (in S&D) and the Liberal Democrats (in ALDE) sit in one of the three 
dominant groups.  The Conservatives left EPP in 2009, to form ECR.  ECR (which 
also includes Jim Nicholson from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)) was on the 
winning side only 56 per cent of the time in EP7 and 58 per cent so far in EP8.  
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Also, the Eurosceptic group, where UKIP sits, have voted against the majority in 
most votes since 2004, while G/EFA, where the Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru sit, 
have won in only 64 per cent of votes since 2004.  In addition, Labour and Lib Dem 
MEPs have lost seats while the Conservatives and UKIP have won seats.  As a 
result, the number of UK MEPs in the three main groups (EPP, S&D and ALDE) has 
fallen from 31 out of 75 MEPs (41 per cent) in 2004 to 21 out of 73 (29 per cent) in 
2015.  Not surprisingly, then, UK MEPs are more marginalised in votes than they 
were before. 
 In addition, within their political groups, UK MEPs often vote against their 
groups’ positions.  In 2009-14, the Conservatives, who dominated ECR, voted with 
the group majority in almost every vote.  In 2004-09, however, when the 
Conservatives (together with a UUP MEP) were in the EPP, they only voted with 
the EPP majority 74 per cent of the time.  This raises an intriguing question: to 
what extent is being the dominant party in a marginalised group (ECR) better than 
being a marginalised party in a dominant group (EPP)?  Meanwhile, in 2009-14, 
Labour MEPs often vote against the S&D position, as did UKIP in EFD, and SNP in 
G/EFA.  Only the Lib Dems and Greens were more likely to follow group 
instructions than the average members of their groups. 
 The combination of sitting in a marginalised group (ECR and EFDD) plus 
voting against the position of the majority of a group (Labour in S&D) means that 
UK parties are considerably less likely to be on the winning side than other 
national parties.  The only exception are the UK Liberal Democrats, who were an 
influential party in the pivotal group before they lost all but one of their MEPs in 
2014.  Interestingly, though, some parties from the UK’s allies are also relatively 
marginalised.  The Swedish Conservatives are less likely to win votes than any 
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other major party in the EPP, while the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats are 
even less likely to win votes than Labour.  
 Overall, European Parliament voting records suggest that the UK is in a 
weak position in this branch of the EU’s legislative system.  Most British MEPs do 
not sit in the groups that dominate the European Parliament agenda.  And even 
when they do sit in these groups – such as the Conservatives in EPP before 2009, 
and Labour in S&D – British MEPs are often opposed to the majority positions of 
these groups.  As a result, British MEPs often find themselves on the losing side in 
key votes. 
 
 
4. Key positions in the European Parliament7 
 
As with votes in the Council, the roll-call voting records in the European 
Parliament do not tell the full story of power and influence in this institution.  
Another key issue is whether UK MEPs capture some of the key positions of power 
in the European Parliament, such as committee chairs or rapporteurships?   
 The European Parliament has two main types of power-positions.  First, 
there are the top offices: the Bureau members, the political group leaders, and the 
chairs of the 22 committees.  The executive Bureau comprises the Parliament’s 
President, the 14 Vice-Presidents (who chair the plenary sessions), and the 5 
Quaestors (who look after the welfare of MEPs).  The political group leaders 
together determine the plenary agenda, while the committee chairs shape their 
committees’ agendas and play a key role in legislative negotiations with EU 
governments and the Commission in their respective policy areas.  These top 
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offices are assigned at the beginning of each 5-yearly term and re-assigned half-
way through a term. 
 Second, there are the rapporteurs.  A rapporteur is an MEP chosen by his or 
her committee to write a report on a piece of legislation, the EU budget or another 
issue.  The rapporteur shepherds the report through the committee and the 
plenary, and leads any negotiations with the EU governments and the Commission.  
MEPs and political groups compete for these powerful positions, as a rapporteur 
can usually influence the amendments the European Parliament proposes and 
hence the eventual shape of the EU law – rather like a ‘sponsor’ of a bill in the U.S. 
Congress. 
  British MEPs have held several ‘top offices’ since 2004.  Two have been 
Vice-Presidents (Edward McMillan-Scott and Diana Wallis), 3 have been Quaestors 
(Jim Nicholson, Bill Newton-Dunn, and Catherine Bearder), 4 have been political 
group leaders (Graham Watson, Martin Callanan, Nigel Farage, and Syed Kamall), 
and 11 have been committees chairs (Giles Chichester, Philip Whitehead, Arlene 
McCarthy, Neil Parish, Sharon Bowles, Malcolm Harbour, Brian Simpson, Sharon 
Bowles, Claude Moraes, Vicky Ford, and Linda McAvan).  In addition, a British MEP 
has chaired the powerful Internal Market committee continuously since 2004, and 
in the current Parliament, British MEPs chair 3 key committees: Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection (Vicky Ford), Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs 
(Claude Moraes), and (International) Development (Linda McAvan).   
 But how does this compare to other member states?   One way of assessing 
this is to compare the per cent of MEPs each member state had in each two-and-a-
half year period (2004-06, 2007-09, 2009-11, 2012-14, 2014-16) with the per cent 
of top offices their MEPs held.  In general, since 2004, when compared to all 
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member states, the UK has been slightly ‘over-represented’, in that there have been 
a larger proportion of British MEPs in top offices than British MEPs as a proportion 
of all MEPs.  Nevertheless, all larger member states win more top offices than 
smaller member states, even relative to their number of MEPs, and the largest 
member state (Germany) does particularly well.  This is because when a political 
group wins a top office, this office almost always goes to an MEP from a larger 
party delegation with the group, which is usually a party from one of the larger 
member states.   
 So, the fairest comparison is between the larger member states.  Compared 
to the other larger member states, the UK is slightly ‘under-represented’ in the top 
offices in the European Parliament.  The UK won more top offices than most other 
large member states in 2009-11, but fewer top offices than the other larger 
member states in every other period since 2004.  
 Turning to rapporteurships, figure 5 shows the proportion of reports 
relative to the proportion of MEPs from each member state in the 2004-09 and 
2009-04 terms.8  MEPs from the older member states, including the UK, are more 
likely to win rapporteurships than MEPs from the member states who joined in the 
2000s.  In fact, UK MEPs (co-)authored 224 reports in 2004-09 and 180 in 2009-
14.  These included reports on important pieces of legislation, such as the EU 
Directive on Local Loop Unbundling, which liberalised the EU internet service-
provider market, and on which Nick Clegg MEP was able to shape the policy in a 
more pro-consumer direction.  In general, in terms of report-writing, UK MEPs 
were ‘overrepresented’ in 2004-09 and slightly ‘underrepresented’ in 2009-14. 
 
Figure 5. Over/under representation of rapporteurships 
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 However, not all rapporteurships are of equal value.  Authoring a report on a 
piece of legislation where the European Parliament has full legislative power is 
clearly more important than authoring a report on an issue on which the 
Parliament has little power.  A slightly different pattern emerges when looking at 
reports on ‘co-decision’ dossiers in 2009-14: on all the legislation on which the 
European Parliament had equal power (alongside the 28 member state 
governments represented in the Council of the European Union) to amend and 
block EU laws.  In this term, when it came to key pieces of EU law, UK MEPs 
authored more reports than the MEPs from every other member state except 
Germany. 
 In short, UK MEPs have captured many powerful agenda-setting positions.  
They have been Vice-Presidents, political group leaders, and chairs of important 
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committees.  UK MEPs have also won rapporteurships on key legislation, which has 
enabled them to shape EU law.  Moreover, UK MEPs have not been 
‘underrepresented’ relative to the MEPs from the other big member states.  And all 
this has been despite the growing number of UKIP MEPs, who have not competed 
for many key offices or rapporteurships. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Overall, then, the evidence on UK influence in the EU’s two main legislative 
institutions is mixed.  In the Council of the European Union, in recent years the UK 
government has been outvoted more often than any other EU government.  Put 
another way, the current Conservative government and the previous Conservative-
Liberal Democrat government were outvoted more often than were the preceding 
Labour governments.  Nevertheless, evidence on connections between officials in 
the Council working groups suggests that UK policy-makers remain at the centre of 
decision-making behind the scenes: with more officials from more member states 
saying that they talk to UK officials than to the officials of any other member state. 
 Meanwhile, in the European Parliament, since 2009 UK MEPs are more 
likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state.   This 
is mainly due to the fact that since the Conservatives left the EPP, and with the 
increase in the number of UKIP MEPs, the number of British MEPs in the three 
main political groups is now lower than for any other large member state.  
However, British MEPs are still able to win some positions of power, such as key 
committee chairs and rapporteurships. 
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 The link between these day-to-day processes and broader EU developments 
is often underestimated.  In particular, when David Cameron, in his bid for the 
Conservative Party leadership in 2005, made a commitment to leave the EPP-ED 
group, he probably underestimated the consequences of such a move.  Most 
Conservative MPs and political commentators in London probably assumed that 
leaving the EPP group would be largely symbolic, with no major political 
consequences.  But, leaving the main centre-right grouping angered many 
Conservative allies, including Angela Merkel (German Chancellor), Fredrik 
Reinfeldt (Swedish Prime Minster), and Donald Tusk (then Polish Prime Minister 
and now European Council President).  More significantly, leaving the EPP meant 
that the UK Conservative Prime Minister was absent from some key EPP summit 
meetings where major decisions were taken, such as the deal on the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty in 2011, the decision to propose Jean-Claude Juncker for 
Commission President in 2014, and the draft EU-UK deal in 2016. 
 In short, if the UK public vote to remain a member of the EU, the UK 
government and the leaderships of Britain’s parties will need to re-engage with 
Brussels politics if they want to maximise their influence in the EU Council, in the 
European Parliament, and on the wider political agenda of the EU.  The 
Conservatives may have to reconsider their relationship with the EPP – with 
perhaps a new EPP-ECR alliance – and the Labour Party will need to decide 
whether they can once again take a more central role in the Socialists and 
Democrats.  Ultimately, being isolated from these two political forces means being 
marginalised from mainstream EU politics.  
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